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Abstract 
The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) intends to renew the leadership of the USA on 
the western alliance. The initiative takes place in a period when a summation 
technology prevails for the aggregation of contributions of NATO allies. We 
investigate whether SDI induces a shift in Hirshleifer’s social composition function. 
Panel data tests over the period 1970-1990 do not confirm any break towards a best-
shot aggregator. SDI does not alter the core of deterrence. It is indeed a public good at 
the US level but not at the NATO level, where it is one of the joint products of the 
alliance. We also investigate the lessons to be drawn for the current debates on 
ballistic defense. 
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SDI, NATO, and the social composition function 
 
1. Introduction 
 According to Hirshleifer (1983), the social composition function of an alliance 
can be summation (Samuelson 1954) but also best-shot or weakest link (Cornes 1993; 
Cornes and Hartley 2007). Collective action significantly depends on the prevailing 
technology of aggregation of allies’ contributions (Sandler 2006). The shared defense 
of NATO is a fine example of the evolution of the social composition function of an 
alliance. The nuclear policy and technology of the USA in the 1950s prompt a best-
shot that prevails until 1970, when the alliance moves to a summation technology 
from 1971 to 1990, then to another summation period, characterized by increased 
strategic behaviors (Sandler and Forbes 1980; Gadea et al. 2004; O’Neal and Elrod 
1989; Khanna and Sandler 1996; Dutheil et al. 2011). At the midst of the first 
summation period, President Reagan initiates the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). 
The so-called Star War project will never be really completed but from its inception it 
contributes to a dramatic increase in military space expenditures (Zervos 2004). 
Admittedly, President Reagan does not properly reach the aim of an effective SDI, in 
budgetary and military terms (Freedman 2003). SDI nevertheless remains a prominent 
feature of Mr. Reagan’s first mandate. The aim is to develop a National Missile 
Defense (NMD) system, an innovative laser-based concept designed to protect the 
United States from long range nuclear missile attacks. Political will is definitely at the 
origin of SDI. It is a means to a renewed leadership of the USA. However, being a 
national rather than a theater missile defense system, this system is controversial 
(O’Hanlon 1999). 
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 The controversy is ongoing. The new strategic concept of NATO emanating 
from the Lisbon Summit in November 2010 cites as a new threat the proliferation of 
ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons. In order to face it, NATO leaders have decided 
to develop missile defense capacities. The first step has been to provide protection to 
NATO deployed forces, with theatre missile defense. The next step consists in 
protecting the civil populations of all NATO allies, with territorial missile defense. In 
June 2011, NATO Defense Ministers approved the NATO Ballistic Missile Defense 
Action Plan. This important strategic move will concern all the allies but the first 
contributor for the technologies involved remains the USA. Even if the time horizon 
for the plan is a decade, it can have an impact on the present behavior of the allies and 
it could drive the alliance towards a period of best-shot technology for the aggregation 
of individual contributions to NATO. In this renewed context, understanding what 
happened during the Star War period can illuminate the ongoing strategic shifts 
towards territorial missile defense. In particular, it can provide lessons about the likely 
evolution of aggregation technologies in the alliance. 
 To our knowledge, the few existing economic studies of SDI mainly focus 
either on the USA-USSR arms race (Zervos 2004) or on the deterrence-defense 
tradeoff in a game-theoretic framework (Brams and Kilgour 1988). Insightful though 
these are, those studies do not take into account two dimensions of the NMD system 
designed by the Reagan administration, which we would like to study here. First, we 
investigate the social composition function of the alliance. NMD is evidently a 
national program, but the national policy of the former best-shot of the western 
alliance might be expected to extend its impact beyond strictly national interests. 
Now, SDI is conceived during a period when NATO works under a summation 
aggregation technology, which leads us to our second point. In budgetary and strategic 
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terms, SDI is an endeavor of tremendous policy consequences: deterrence has indeed 
been the key to the initial strategy of NATO. Can it be replaced with defense provided 
by the US NMD? Can we find empirical evidence that SDI provided a best-shot 
during the nineteen-eighties? Instead of adopting a long term perspective for the 
identification of social composition functions (Gadea et al. 2004; Dutheil et al. 2011), 
we focus our statistical analysis on the period 1970-1990 in order to try to capture and 
identify a possible breakpoint in aggregation technologies for the NATO alliance 
during the SDI period. We thus follow the track of Conybeare et al. (1994) who 
investigate and propose ways of distinguishing best-shot, weakest-link and summation 
aggregation technologies in military alliances, with an empirical focus on World War 
One and Cold War alliances. We will show that our results corroborate their own 
analysis of NATO over the period 1961-1987, though they are obtained through a 
different empirical strategy. 
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the way in which SDI 
is both a technological innovation and a political will that can alter the social 
composition function of the alliance. Section 3 presents the econometric results 
testing the possibility for the USA to become a best-shot in NATO during the 
nineteen-eighties. Section 4 provides a discussion of those empirical results. 
2. “The Cold War is over”: the political economy of Star War 
 The above quotation is from President Reagan leaving office in January 1989 
after two mandates. In the early 1980s, US-Soviet relations enter a phase of intense 
friction, potentially as dangerous as the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. The magnitude of 
the perceived threat is probably amplified by the US presidential campaign of 1980. 
Nevertheless, when the then elected President Reagan launches the Strategic Defense 
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Initiative with his speech of March 23, 1983, it spurs or revives the space arms race 
between the two superpowers of the time. Econometric evidence (Zervos 2004) 
reinforces the argument that SDI contributes to the bankruptcy of the Soviet Union. At 
the time of its launching however, heated arguments fuel a debate full of technical and 
strategic controversies. Greenberg (2000) mentions how SDI can be conceived as a 
bargaining chip for arms control negotiations. It can also be interpreted as a way to 
undermine the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, providing a way to modify it rather 
than withdrawing from it (O’Hanlon 1999), thereby minimizing the diplomatic 
consequences of a rather bold initiative. 
 Interpreted in the social composition function framework of Hirshleifer, SDI is 
a defense innovation supported by the political power in an attempt to strengthen the 
US position against the Soviet threat. A likely consequence is that the USA may again 
become a best-shot within NATO. Now, if we adopt a long run perspective, the 
inception of SDI approximately takes place in the middle of a period of summation 
technology for the NATO alliance. 1970-1990 is indeed characterized by the flexible 
escalation doctrine by which primary fronts involve non-nuclear engagements only, 
nuclear weapons being kept within second stage interdiction strikes. The technology 
of aggregation of technologies in the western alliance has thus moved from a best-
shot played by the USA from 1955 to 1970, to a summation composition function that 
gives a renewed weight to conventional forces. Behind this change in aggregation 
technology lays a new strategic doctrine put forward by NATO directive MC14/3 of 
January 16, 1968 whereby “The conventional forces of the Alliance, land, sea and air, 
many of which are organically supported by tactical nuclear weapons, are a further 
essential component of the deterrent” (MC14/3, 25c; see also MC14/3, A8). This new 
strategic concept is to be implemented through measures described in NATO directive 
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MC48/3 of December 8, 1969. The USA does follow the strategic line proponing 
“The requirement for adequate conventional forces and for improving capabilities for 
non-nuclear operations while maintaining NATO’s nuclear capability. This should 
include achieving optimum dual capability, especially in air forces, and the flexibility 
to employ these forces in non-nuclear operations” (MC 48/3, 5b). Concurrently, the 
American political scene progressively develops a rhetoric pushing forward the 
imminent Soviet domination, culminating with Ronald Reagan’s election. SDI can be 
seen as an attempt to go beyond the current state of strategic military doctrine of the 
time. That political will would involve a change in the aggregation technology of the 
western alliance. 
 It is true that SDI is never properly realized as such, if only because the time-
scale for implementation would be decades rather than years. In the meantime, arms 
control progressively appears to be a more plausible means of escaping from mutual 
assured destruction (as evidenced for instance by the December 1987 treaty aiming at 
eliminating intermediate nuclear forces). Nevertheless, as a political initiative, the 
simple announcement of SDI breeds such hostility on the Soviet side that it reinforces 
its credibility, probably more than is deserved (Freedman 2003). Furthermore, budgets 
point at a “best-shot” effort by the USA. Since the announcement of SDI in 1983, the 
USA has spent $3.5 billion a year on missile defense programs (O’Hanlon 1999). The 
rise in space military expenditures matches that of the early 1960s during the space 
race between “Apollo and Sputnik”. Furthermore, Zervos (2004) identifies 1986 as 
the date when the US space military expenditures surpass the Soviet ones for the first 
time in history, as a consequence of a trend rooted back in the mid-1970s. The ensuing 
candidacy for best-shot is exemplified by Sandler (2006): the “Star War” best-shooter 
has the capability to destroy enough missiles from the first strike of the enemy to 
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deter it from attacking. At the scale of the alliance, only one such system is required. 
The defense missile system can at first glance be viewed as a best-shot public good. 
There remains to check whether it is the case or not. 
3. Econometric analysis 
The theoretical setting behind our empirical investigations is that of a joint 
product model of alliance. A pure public good best-shot model would imply zero 
contributions by non best-shot allies and obviously would not be realistic in our case. 
The joint product model is thus a rather more adequate framework. In a joint product 
setting, Nash equilibrium conditions have been provided by Sandler (1977) in the 
summation case and by Conybeare et al. (1994) in the best-shot case. We use here a 
simple model to describe both cases. The alliance consists of countries  = 1,⋯ , . 
Allies have initial endowments  (e.g. annual GDP) with numéraire 	 expressing 
private consumption as well as the provision of non-military national public goods. 
Defense activity 
 with unit price  involves a contribution to the alliance-wide 
deterrence  and an ally-specific local public good. The utility function is 
 = (	, 
, (
, … , 
 , … , 
 
The Nash program of a given ally  is (Cornes and Sandler 1984) 
max
,
					 = 	, 
, (
, … , 
, … , 
 
 !	!"					 + 
 = 		 
Following Dutheil et al. (2011), in the case of a summation aggregation technology, 
the reaction function of ally  is 
(1								
 = $(%, ,  
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With % the sum of the defense expenditures of allies other than ally . In the best-
shot case, the reaction function of non best-shot country  is 
(2							
 = $('(, ,  
With '( the defense expenditure of the best-shot ally; the latter has the reaction 
function 
'( = $'(('(, . Equipped with those testable forms, we now move 
on to the empirical analysis per se. 
The panel goes over the period 1970-1990 for 14 NATO allies (Belgium, 
Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal, Turkey, the UK, and the USA). Data is obtained from NATO 2009 
sources for national defense expenditures (denoted by )*+ for ally ) and IMF 2008 
for GDP (denoted by ),). Units are million USD and the logarithm of variables is 
used in the regressions on this balanced panel data set. Under a summation 
technology, considering a given ally , the other allies’ cumulated defense efforts are 
denoted by -./ = ∑ )*+112 . Under a best-shot technology, 3- = max12 )*+1  
with 3-4567%6897 = 0. 
 In the first stage we use OLS with the Panel Corrected Standard Errors (PCSE) 
method (Beck and Katz 1995) with fixed effects and lagged variables. Two models are 
tested, each of them characterized by an aggregation technology assumed to be 
constant over the whole period 1970-1990: 
(3							)*+,7 = <, + =),,7 +	>-./,7% + ?,7 
(4							)*+,7 = <A, + =A),,7 + >A3-,7% + ?,7 
Equation 3 is the reaction function of ally  within a summation technology (equation 
1) while equation 4 corresponds to the best-shot case (equation 2). Table 1 provides 
the estimations of the two equations. Coefficients for ), are significant at the 1% 
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level. However, none of the two aggregation technologies have significant 
coefficients. We thus hypothesize that a break may occur during the period, with a 
shift from one social composition function to another or a change in the behavior of 
the allies within a given technology of aggregation. 
(Table 1 about here) 
 The empirical strategy is then to introduce unknown breakpoints BC within the 
period. We define them in the following way: 
(5							E*FG1,7% = BC × E*FG,7% 
The aggregation technology is represented by variable E*FG, which is such that 
E*FG = -./	"I	3-. The social composition function can be either summation or 
best-shot. Dummy variable BC takes value 1 from 1970 until year J and value 0 
afterwards. Until date J, E*FG1 = -./1	"I	3-1: during the first period, summation 
or best-shot can prevail. Afterwards, E*FG2 = -./2	"I	3-2: there may or may not 
be a shift in the aggregation technology. 
 Still using the PCSE method, we test all possible combinations of breakpoints 
BC from 1970 to 1990 and of aggregation technologies (for instance 3-1 then -./2	 
or -./1 then -./2): 
(6							)*+,7 = < + =),,7 + L	E*FG1,7% + LA	E*FG2,7% + ?,7	
If the SDI hypothesis is verified, then we could expect a technology shift from 
summation to best-shot around 1983. However, in statistical terms, this is one 
possibility amongst many others. With a time horizon of 21 years and 4 possible 
combinations of aggregation technologies, 84 models are in competition and must be 
investigated as such. Detailed estimations are provided in appendix 1. Only five 
models emerge with significant coefficients. Table 2 sums up the results. Model A 
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evidences best-shot until 1972 and then summation. Model B does the same with a 
break in 1975. Model E begins with best-shot with a break in 1981 followed by 
another best-shot. Models C and D show two summation periods with respective 
breaks in 1980 and 1981. 
(Table 2 about here) 
 We then run J tests in order to cross-evaluate the five models remaining in 
competition (detailed results are provided in appendix 2). Models A, B and E can be 
rejected at the 1% threshold. Models C and D are quite similar, with close break dates 
and the same aggregation pattern. None of them is rejected at the 1% threshold. 
Model D cannot be rejected at the 5% threshold (except when compared to model C). 
At the 10% threshold, no specification dominates. All in all, model D and to a slightly 
lesser extent model C seem to provide the best specifications. A constant social 
composition function seems to prevail, namely summation, over the whole period 
comprehending the Strategic Defense Initiative. The econometric analysis does not 
confirm any technology shift towards best-shot. 
 Our result corroborates that of Conybeare et al. (1994) while using a different 
empirical strategy. Conybeare et al. (1994) distinguish best shot, weakest link, and 
summation aggregation technologies, and applied cross-sectional data analysis to four 
alliances on the entire period: Triple Alliance (1880–1914), Triple Entente (1880–
1914), Warsaw Pact (1963–1987), and NATO (1961–1987). For the latter, the authors 
conclude on the prevalence of summation-type ally behavior over best-shot or 
weakest-link behavior (p.541). Here we use panel data and we allow a break in the 
considered period. Although the empirical strategies are different, both lines of 
research suggest that NATO abides by a summation aggregation technology as soon 
as conventional forces get more and more weight in the alliance. This is also the case 
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with the Warsaw Pact (Conybeare et al. 1994). Best-shot attributes (nuclear deterrence 
by the alliance leaders) could provide incentives to free-ride on the best-shooter. 
However, potential risks of weakest-link would lead western allies voluntarily to 
engage into matching behaviors of sustained contributions to their alliance (matching 
would be centrally planned within the Warsaw Pact). Nonetheless, what we would 
like to discuss now is why a political initiative as striking and prominent as SDI did 
not trigger a shift in the social composition function of NATO. 
4. Discussion 
 The expected shift of technology from summation to best-shot following SDI 
does not seem to take place. If ever there is a change in the behavior of the allies, it 
happens earlier in 1980 or 1981 and it remains within a summation framework with 
only a slight change in the contributing behavior of allies from the first to the second 
period. To try to understand why SDI does not shift the social composition function 
towards a best-shot aggregator, it may prove insightful to go back to the earlier years 
of NATO when the USA did play best-shot. 
 As Pedlow (1997) recalls it, the first prominent NATO strategy document 
emanates from the Military Committee (MC), composed of NATO’s chiefs of staff. It 
is issued as directive MC3 on October 19, 1949. Reading MC3 is extremely 
rewarding for those interested in the making of collective action. The best-shot nature 
of the alliance at its inception is straightforwardly announced: “Insure the ability to 
deliver the atomic bomb promptly. This is primarily a US responsibility assisted as 
practicable by other nations” (MC3 7a). Under the item “cooperative measures”, the 
directive claims that “The essence of our overall concept is to develop a maximum of 
strength through collective defense planning” (MC3 8). Though the expression 
12 
SDI and NATO final revision-1 
“atomic bomb” is soon replaced in the later documents by “strategic bombing”, it 
nevertheless remains that NATO basically aims at providing deterrence as a pure 
public good inside the alliance. 
 Deterrence is indeed plainly and forcefully described as such in directive 
MC48 of November 22, 1954. “In face of the threat of such a war, the primary aim of 
NATO, must more than ever before, be to prevent war. This aim can only be achieved 
if the Allied nations are so powerful in the vital elements of modern warfare that the 
enemy will conclude that he has little hope of winning a war involving NATO. This 
means that NATO must be able to withstand the initial Soviet onslaught, to deliver 
decisive atomic counter-attacks against the war-making capacity of the enemy, and to 
prevent the rapid overrunning of Europe” (MC48 33). In economic terms, deterrence 
is a pure public good. It is non rival: unlike situations involving conventional forces, 
retaliation can take place whatever the magnitude or geographical aim of the threat. It 
is also non-excludable: all allies are protected and none can be excluded. Finally, the 
use of the public good is mandatory once the allies have signed the Treaty. Deterrence 
is a credible commitment: the automatic pledge of retaliation is sustained by the fact 
that NATO would have a first-strike advantage and a second-strike capability thanks 
to its sufficient stockpile of nuclear weapons. 
 First-strike deterrence thus works as a collective good provided to the 
members of the alliance. The aggregation technology during 1949-1970 is not 
summation, but best-shot. This does not mean that non best-shot contributions are 
redundant or useless. The latter statement is largely denied by the very writing of such 
a fundamental document as directive MC48. Complementarity remains crucial in the 
alliance, thereby justifying the joint product approach. 
13 
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 In a context of summation, SDI can appear as an attempt at reinstalling the 
best-shot status of the USA while securing the ballistic protection of the US territory. 
However, to become a successful best-shot implies that you have the capacity to 
provide the core of the public good that unites the allies. Now, SDI is a NMD policy 
with strategic aims that are radically different from standard Theater Missile Defense 
(TMD), like for instance Patriot missiles. Our point is that this national defense 
initiative amounts to fueling the alliance with a private good. SDI is indeed a public 
good at the US level but at the NATO level, it is a private good that becomes one of 
the joint products of the alliance as they have been analyzed by Sandler and Hartley 
(2001): strategic, tactical and conventional weapons are complementary in the overall 
strategy, and SDI is one of them. President Reagan’s first mandate displays a political 
will to bend down the USSR, pushing forward a US national defense system in an 
alliance characterized from its inception by global nuclear deterrence. 
 Another aspect of our discussion is that the doctrine of flexible response 
initiated in the late 1960s shows a significant inflexion from 1981 until the shift to the 
crisis management doctrine in 1990 (Sandler and Murdoch 2000, Table 1, p.305). 
Besides the US efforts, France and UK proceed to build-up and modernize their 
strategic arsenals thereby increasing deterrence and the share of jointly produced non-
excludable public outputs. At the same time, NATO adopts the forward-defense (deep 
strike) strategy in 1984. Precision-guided munitions target the Warsaw Pact rear-
echelon forces. The new strategy reduces the importance of the thinning conventional 
forces. Sandler and Murdoch (2000) consider that this inflexion in the implementation 
of the flexible response doctrine augments the share of non-excludable benefits 
derived from defense. In the context of our discussion, if these events do increase the 
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publicness of defense activity, this is not solely due to one ally but to the joined efforts 
of a handful of them, which decreases the likelihood of a single best-shot. 
 There are certainly lessons to be drawn from that “Star War” episode. It may 
illuminate the current debates on missile defense. Considering the current variety and 
dispersion of threats that NATO faces, the weakest-link technology may want 
renewed consideration, not only for moral hazard considerations but also for the 
possible technological weakness of the defense system of one of the allies. The 
achievement of the Territorial Missile Defense strategy might be a way to prevent it. 
The guess is that missile defense strategy, even within the framework of a summation 
social composition function, “would be able to knock down enough of an enemy’s 
missiles so that if he ever pushed a button to attack, he would be doing so in the 
knowledge that his attack was unable to prevent a devastating retaliatory strike 
(Reagan’s memoirs, quoted by Greenberg 2000, p.140). And the ballistic initiative of 
the USA would prove useful to NATO, if not best-shot. 
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Table 1: Estimation results for the significant technology combinations without 
breakpoints 
Variables 
Model of 
constant 
summation 
Model of 
constant 
best-shot 
), 
0.677*** 
(0.081) 
0.683*** 
(0.074) 
-./ 
-0.025 
(0.119)  
3-  
-0.036 
(0.090) 
MA 0.993 0.994 
(***) significant at the 1% level 
 
Table 2: Estimation results for the significant technology combinations with 
breakpoints 
Variables 
Model A 
J = 1972 
Model B 
J = 1975 
Model C 
J = 1980 
Model D 
J = 1981 
Model E 
J = 1981 
), 
0.720*** 
(8.913) 
0.714*** 
(8.786) 
0.704*** 
(9.859) 
0.713*** 
(9.958) 
0.675*** 
(9.900) 
-./1   
-0.217** 
(-2.027) 
-0.243** 
(-2.132)  
-./2 
-0.010** 
(-2.225) 
-0.009* 
(-1.927) 
-0.212** 
(-1.996) 
-0.238** 
(-2.106)  
3-1 
-0.009* 
(-1.882) 
-0.008* 
(-1.763)   
-0.155* 
(-1.802) 
3-2     
-0.151* 
(-1.771) 
MA 0.994 0.994 0.995 0.995 0.995 
(*), (**), (***): respectively significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level 
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Appendix 1: Estimations of breakpoints under the various aggregation combinations 
 
 
pcse1970 pcse1971 pcse1972 pcse1973 pcse1974 pcse1975 pcse1976 
), 0.701*** 0.704*** 0.748*** 0.644*** 0.652*** 0.743*** 0.693*** 
-./1 -0.070 -0.073 -0.090 -0.044 -0.091 -0.089 -0.079 
-./2 -0.070 -0.072 -0.092 -0.040 -0.086 -0.091 -0.078 
 
pcse1977 pcse1978 pcse1979 pcse1980 pcse1981 pcse1982 pcse1983 
), 0.706*** 0.721*** 0.706*** 0.704*** 0.713*** 0.727*** 0.711*** 
-./1 -0.099 -0.093 -0.146 -0.217** -0.243** -0.139 -0.092 
-./2 -0.098 -0.093 -0.143 -0.212** -0.238** -0.137 -0.092 
 
pcse1984 pcse1985 pcse1986 pcse1987 pcse1988 pcse1989 pcse1990 
), 0.730*** 0.744*** 0.744*** 0.766*** 0.773*** 0.741*** 0.714*** 
-./1 -0.074 -0.075 -0.108 -0.074 -0.086 -0.087 -0.085 
-./2 -0.075 -0.075 -0.108 -0.076 -0.089 -0.088 0.000 
 
 
 
pcse1970 pcse1971 pcse1972 pcse1973 pcse1974 pcse1975 pcse1976 
), 0.662*** 0.664*** 0.715*** 0.623*** 0.619*** 0.710*** 0.660*** 
-./1 0.012*** 0.006 0.009** 0.003 0.004 0.008* 0.001 
3-2 0.015*** 0.008 0.008* 0.008* 0.010** 0.007 0.002 
 
pcse1977 pcse1978 pcse1979 pcse1980 pcse1981 pcse1982 pcse1983 
), 0.674*** 0.688*** 0.656*** 0.639*** 0.644*** 0.689*** 0.700*** 
-./1 0.002 -0.000 -0.005 -0.005 -0.008* -0.003 -0.001 
3-2 0.003 -0.000 -0.003 -0.002 -0.005 -0.003 -0.002 
 
pcse1984 pcse1985 pcse1986 pcse1987 pcse1988 pcse1989 pcse1990 
), 0.726*** 0.738*** 0.729*** 0.749*** 0.747*** 0.711*** 0.714*** 
-./1 -0.004 -0.003 0.000 0.003 0.002 0.003 -0.085 
3-2 -0.006 -0.005 -0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.003 0.000 
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  pcse1970 pcse1971 pcse1972 pcse1973 pcse1974 pcse1975 pcse1976 
), 0.674*** 0.672*** 0.720*** 0.627*** 0.624*** 0.714*** 0.662*** 
3-1 -0.015*** -0.008* -0.009* -0.008* -0.011** -0.008* -0.003 
-./2 -0.013*** -0.007 -0.010** -0.003 -0.005 -0.009* -0.001 
  pcse1977 pcse1978 pcse1979 pcse1980 pcse1981 pcse1982 pcse1983 
), 0.674*** 0.687*** 0.654*** 0.637*** 0.642*** 0.688*** 0.700*** 
3-1 -0.004 -0.001 0.002 0.001 0.004 0.002 0.001 
-./2 -0.003 -0.001 0.004 0.004 0.006 0.002 0.001 
  pcse1984 pcse1985 pcse1986 pcse1987 pcse1988 pcse1989 pcse1990 
), 0.726*** 0.739*** 0.731*** 0.750*** 0.747*** 0.712*** 0.704*** 
3-1 0.005 0.004 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.004 -0.064 
-./2 0.003 0.003 -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 0.000 
 
 
 
pcse1970 pcse1971 pcse1972 pcse1973 pcse1974 pcse1975 pcse1976 
), 0.678*** 0.685*** 0.729*** 0.630*** 0.631*** 0.725*** 0.681*** 
3-1 -0.036 -0.041 -0.073 -0.013 -0.043 -0.070 -0.056 
3-2 -0.034 -0.040 -0.074 -0.009 -0.037 -0.071 -0.054 
 
pcse1977 pcse1978 pcse1979 pcse1980 pcse1981 pcse1982 pcse1983 
), 0.689*** 0.707*** 0.684*** 0.671*** 0.675*** 0.703*** 0.702*** 
3-1 -0.074 -0.067 -0.092 -0.133* -0.155* -0.085 -0.068 
3-2 -0.073 -0.067 -0.090 -0.129 -0.151* -0.084 -0.068 
 
pcse1984 pcse1985 pcse1986 pcse1987 pcse1988 pcse1989 pcse1990 
), 0.735*** 0.746*** 0.733*** 0.755*** 0.759*** 0.727*** 0.704*** 
3-1 -0.049 -0.046 -0.083 -0.055 -0.061 -0.066 -0.064 
3-2 -0.050 -0.048 -0.082 -0.057 -0.064 -0.066 0.000 
 
(*), (**), (***): respectively significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level 
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Appendix 2: J tests 
 
A versus A A versus B A versus C A versus D A versus E 
), 0.0000 0.1408 0.0555 0.0596 0.0231 
3-1 0.0000 -0.0072 -0.0078* -0.0077* -0.0087* 
3-2 
     
-./1 
     
-./2 0.0000 -0.0085* -0.0091** -0.0089** -0.0102** 
      
J-test estimates (a) 1.0000*** 0.8396 0.9699*** 0.9643*** 1.0250** 
 
 
 B versus A B versus B B versus C B versus D B versus E 
), 0.0986 0.0000 0.0386 0.0467 0.0142 
3-1 -0.0062 0.0000 -0.0060 -0.0058 -0.0067 
3-2 
     
-./1 
     
-./2 -0.0068 0.0000 -0.0069* -0.0066 -0.0079* 
 
     
J-test estimates 0.8939* 1.0000*** 0.9836*** 0.9683*** 1.0215** 
 
 
C versus A C versus B C versus C C versus D C versus E 
), 0.0535 0.0897 -0.0000 0.0495 0.1172 
3-1 
     
3-2 
     
-./1 -0.1984* -0.1949* -0.0000 -0.1141 -0.1377 
-./2 -0.1937* -0.1901* -0.0000 -0.1098 -0.1335 
      
J-test estimates 0.9396** 0.8769* 1.0000*** 0.8691** 0.8027* 
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 D versus A D versus B D versus C D versus D D versus E 
), 0.0821 0.1411 0.0443 0.0000 1.5766* 
3-1 
     
3-2 
     
-./1 -0.2216* -0.2197* -0.1321 -0.0000 -0.4869** 
-./2 -0.2169* -0.2149* -0.1278 -0.0000 -0.4771** 
 
     
J-test estimates 0.9112* 0.8174 0.8876** 1.0000*** -1.2180 
 
 
 E versus A E versus B E versus C E versus D E versus E 
), -0.0477 -0.0020 0.0143 -0.6706 0.0000 
3-1 -0.1639* -0.1544* -0.0695 0.1817 0.0000 
3-2 -0.1597* -0.1502* -0.0659 0.1763 0.0000 
-./1 
     
-./2 
     
 
     
J-test estimates 1.0585** 0.9761* 0.9171*** 2.0025** 1.0000** 
 
(a) If the coefficient is statistically significant, the competing model specification is the best 
(*), (**), (***): respectively significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level 
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